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This article considers the temporal dimension of data processing and use and the ways in
which it affects the production and interpretation of knowledge claims. I start by distin-
guishing the time at which data collection, dissemination, and analysis occur (Data time,
or Dt) from the time in which the phenomena for which data serve as evidence operate
(Phenomena time, or Pt). Building on the analysis of two examples of data reuse from
modeling and experimental practices in biology, I then argue that Dt affects how re-
searchers (1) select and interpret data as evidence and (2) identify and understand phe-
nomena.1. Introduction: Data Time, Phenomena Time, and the Epistemic Role
of Data Processing Efforts. Existing analyses of the epistemic status and
role of scientific data have focused on synchronous aspects of research, often
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All uof data affect processes of inference and knowledge generation. In this arti-
cle, I analyze the temporality of the data practices required to facilitate data-
to-phenomena inferences and its impact on researchers’ inferential reason-
ing and understanding of the phenomena under study. I argue that concerns
around the temporality and historicity of data practices affect any research
situation in which data are (re)used at a time and place other than those in
which they are generated. This article thus considers the epistemological con-
cerns and challenges involved in processing data to facilitate their preserva-
tion and analysis in the long term and in identifying the conditions under
which data can be kept, shared, and analyzed through time, thus enabling re-
searchers to build on past efforts and boost future research.
Many philosophical discussions of the temporality of data and its impli-
cations for research revolve around the credibility of the evidential strategies
employed by the historical sciences—typically defined as sciences that at-
tempt to reconstruct and explain long-lost events and objects (such as extinct
organisms, ecosystems, human cultures, and climatic conditions) and that
therefore contend with scarce, sporadic, and partial data sources. The differ-
ential survival of evidence through time has been argued to provide relatively
poor evidential ground for knowledge claims, making the historical sciences
hostage to “lucky finds” in terms of what they can and cannot investigate and
explain.1 In this article, I argue that concerns around whether and how data
maintain evidential value through time are not restricted to the historical sci-
ences but are common to any field in which data acquired in previous periods
can play a significant role as evidence for subsequent research or in situations
in which investigators spend long periods of time investigating and revisiting
the same data sets. These situations occur both in experimental and field-
based research and whether or not the data in question are quantitative or
qualitative. Indeed, I will argue that experimental data are particularly time
sensitive due to the ever-changing nature of the know-how and laboratory
conditions under which they are produced, which makes these data difficult
to preserve as meaningful and reusable sources of evidence. This issue is of-
ten underestimated by philosophers who emphasize the degree of experimen-
tal control exercised by researchers at themoment of producing data yet disre-
gard the easewithwhich such control can be lost once the original experimental
setup changes or ceases to exist or the data are retrieved and examined by re-
searchers working in different laboratory conditions.2
As a starting point for analysis, I propose to distinguish between two
types of temporalities involved in knowledge production and interpretation:
the temporal dimension of data practices used to prepare and manage data so1. Sober (1988, 1–2), Currie and Turner (2016), and Currie (2018) provide a useful over-
view of these arguments.
2. As is often the case in contemporary data-centric biology (Leonelli 2016).
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THE TIME OF DATA 743that they can be subjected to inferential reasoning (which I will refer to as
Data time, or Dt) and that of the phenomena under investigation, for which
data are meant to serve as evidence (Phenomena time, or Pt).3 Dt is closely
associated to the ways in which researchers manage time in their work, par-
ticularly to the constraints and opportunities posed by the time spent in the
production, dissemination, and analysis of data. Pt refers instead to the as-
sumptions that researchers make about the temporal features of their re-
search targets and the ways in which such assumptions condition their un-
derstanding of the natural world as well as their investigative strategies.
The distinction builds heavily on Bogen andWoodward’s (1988) seminal
work on the material conditions under which researchers make data-to-
phenomena inferences, which stand in striking contrast to the constraints that
apply to the development of a priori, logical inferences (Woodward 2000). At
the same time, my views on the categories of “data” and “phenomena” differ
from Bogen and Woodward’s in two respects. First, I explicitly endorse a re-
lational understanding of the epistemology of data, according to which data
are identified and conceptualized in relation to their function within specific
situations of inquiry (Leonelli 2015, 2016).4 Second, I favor an interpretation
of the ontological status of phenomena as human constructs rather than actual
features of theworld—although, contrary toMcAllister’s (2010) antirealist in-
terpretation, I view such constructs as highly constrained by the characteris-
tics of processes and entities in the world and, thus, reliably capturing aspects
of reality as researchers experience it (Massimi 2009; Feest 2011).
These premises are salient to my proposed distinction between Dt and Pt.
On the one hand, they are consistent with Dt and Pt being intertwined in sci-
entific practice, with both dimensions typically affected by practical consid-
erations such as the resources, materials, institutional frameworks, and tech-
nologies available to researchers. As Griesemer andYamashita (2005) argued
in relation to research on biological model systems, phenomena have no in-
trinsic time-scale: the temporality that researchers ascribe to phenomena de-
pends at least in part on the circumstances of inquiry, which often include is-
sues of data access and data analysis. In a similar way, the temporality of data
is defined largely by the research contexts in which they are used, which of-
ten include specific conceptualizations of phenomena. On the other hand, the
interdependence of Dt and Pt does not make it any less useful to distinguish3. My position is thus sympathetic to the analysis of the relation between experimental
and historical sciences provided by Cleland (2002) and Turner (2004), although their dis-
cussion of the role of the temporal asymmetry of underdetermination does not explicitly
consider the distinction between Dt and Pt, thus underestimating the relevance of prac-
tical issues of data preservation and handling to the warrant available to claims about past
and present events.
4. Recent work by Woodward (2010) indicates affinities with this view, yet neither
Bogen nor Woodward has devoted much attention to defining what they mean by data.
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All uthem analytically. Focusing specifically on Dt means paying attention to the
efforts involved in data generation, processing, dissemination, and analysis
and the large variability in the stages—and related timescales—throughwhich
any given data set is handled and interpreted. This temporal dimension can
have a significant impact on how Pt is measured, but it is conceptually sep-
arate from Pt: Dt pertains to the realm of inquiry and research processes (the
so-called context of discovery), rather than to the knowledge derived from
such processes.
In what follows, I use the distinction between Dt and Pt to examine two
cases from contemporary biological practice in which researchers attempt to
reuse data previously collected by others as evidence for novel claims about
phenomena.5 The first case involves the construction of models to track and
predict the spread of plant pathogens, which is grounded on the retrieval and
integration of data from a variety of sources and is highly dependent on the
accuracy with which Dt is preserved and managed. The second case is typ-
ical of experimental work on regulatory mechanisms within molecular and
cell biology and concerns the retrieval and comparison of data collected on
two species of yeast to study the role of the cell cycle in regulating transcrip-
tion in humans, potentially resulting in breakthroughs in the understanding
of cancer onset and development.
These examples illustrate how the distinction between Dt and Pt helps to
highlight two important features of scientific knowledge production. First,
the ways in which researchers acknowledge and document Dt affect the ex-
tent to which they can successfully preserve data, integrate them with other
data, and (re)use them as evidence for new claims. In other words, knowl-
edge about Dt affects researchers’ ability to identify relevant data and assess
their reliability and significance as evidence for a given hypothesis. Second,
knowledge of Dt affects researchers’ understanding of the phenomena for
which data are taken to serve as evidence and, thus, the content of the knowl-
edge claims derived from data analysis.
2. Data Reuse Case 1: Modeling the Global Spread of Plant Patho-
gens. My first example concerns contemporary attempts to track the global
distribution andmovements of plant pathogens (such as the fungusHemileia
vastatrix, responsible for the infamous coffee rust disease, or the various
blights severely affecting the cultivation of banana, wheat, and major crops)
over the last century, with the goal of identifying trends that may help to pre-5. These examples have been researched through an analysis of scientific literature and
online tools such as databases, as well as interviews with the scientists involved, which I
carried out in 2014 and 2015 and which helped me to reconstruct the activities and rea-
soning involved in data processing and analysis. Full transcripts of those conversations
that interviewees consented to make available online are available in Leonelli (2017).
This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
THE TIME OF DATA 745dict crop pathogen spread across the globe and its potential impact on agri-
culture. A key source of data underpinning such efforts are observational re-
ports on pathogens. These reports are typically collected by field stations and
plant clinics located on various sites around the world and later assembled
into a unique body of evidence by initiatives such as the Plantwise database
of the Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International (CABI). CABI
uses observational reports to produce maps tracking the geographical spread
of different pathogens through several decades (e.g., fig. 1).
These efforts are hampered by the lack of consistent observational data
documenting pathogen movements across different parts of the world. Rec-
ords for low-income regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Amer-
ica, for instance, are patchy at best, and significant time intervals are missing
even for well-monitored countries. Furthermore, the ways in which different
field stations assemble, store, and disseminate pathogen observation data are
highly variable and not easily amenable to integration into global maps. To
remedy this situation, researchers have devised modeling tools to infer plau-
sible pathogen movements from environmental factors. These models build
on available knowledge of the conditions under which fungi are likely to
produce spores and infect their hosts, such as temperature and the availabil-
ity of water on the leaf surface of the plants in question (i.e., when it is too
dry, too hot, or too cold, the spores die). This knowledge enables researchersFigure 1. Global spread of tomato pathogen Oidium neolycopersici in 2007. Source:
CABI Head Office, Map no. 1000, edition 1, CAB International, Wallingford, UK,
2007.This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
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All uto infer infection rates from the triangulation of observational data with mea-
surements of air temperature, which are often available thanks to the ubiq-
uity of meteorological stations, and estimates of the amount of water in the
crop canopy.
Such work can then be used to develop models to predict future trends
and target measures to stop the spread of harmful pathogens. It is at this point
that this example becomes relevant for an investigation of Dt. This attempt to
put old observational data to a new use prompted some of the researchers
involved to take a closer look at how the observational data from pathogen
reports had been compiled and assembled in the first place and the extent to
which they could be reliably aligned with meteorological data. This brought
to light two challenges that had not been apparent at the start of the modeling
effort, and which I found to underpin most cases of data reuse in biology, with
significant implications for data analysis and subsequent interpretations.
The first challenge lies in reconstructing Dt for the key data set underpin-
ning CABImaps (i.e., pathogen reports). This involves several distinct events,
which in some cases are separated by 1 or 2 decades, including:se subDt1: data collection, for example, the date on which a local farmer brought
an affected plant specimen to a plant clinic for pathogen identification;
Dt2: compilation of observational data sets into a consistent report about
pathogen spread in the region of interest;
Dt3: official publication of the compiled data, for example, in a journal or
a report;
Dt4: use of publications as sources for national maps of pathogen spread;
Dt5: incorporation of national maps into a global digital repository or on-
line database, such as that run by CABI;
Dt6: retrieval of the data from the repository for further analysis.It turns out that published maps can be unreliable in their temporal location
of data and subsequent data processing and interventions and often conflate
Dt2–Dt6 with Dt1. Particularly in the case of data older than 10 years, exten-
sive efforts are now required to date Dt1 and disentangle it from other Dts. In
the absence of an accurate timeline for data processing, it is hard for research-
ers to construct reliable predictive models. The lack of certainty around Dt
also decreases researchers’ ability to quantify underreporting and thus the
extent to which data may be missing for specific areas/periods/pathogens
(Bebber, Holmes, and Gurr 2014).This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
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THE TIME OF DATA 747The second challenge consists in aligning Dt across the diverse data
sources at hand, including pathogen location reports, water estimates, and
climate data. Given the amount of processing required to prepare data for
use in modeling, Dt is much longer and more complicated for pathogen dis-
tribution and water estimates than for air temperature—a difference made
more dramatic by the recent introduction of direct temperature measurements
via satellite. A consequence of this temporal mismatch is that integrating data
sources requires considerable and expert judgment labor, with researchers
needing to use their knowledge of the territory and the species in question
to adjudicate specific cases. The ways in which researchers choose to tempo-
rally align these different data sets affect their characterization of the phenom-
ena of interest (such as pathogen spread) and their temporal dimensions (e.g.,
the rate of spread), which go on to affect the predictive ability of themodels in
which they are assumed.
3. Data Reuse Case 2: Identifying Conserved Regulatory Mechanisms
across Species. Shifting now from modeling to experimental practices, my
second example concerns the use of experimental data to study the regula-
tory mechanisms at work in the cell cycle and assessing potential links be-
tween defects in protein regulation and the proliferation of tumor cells.6 To
identify and study regulatory pathways that may be conserved in humans,
researchers often resort to analyzing data coming from much simpler forms
of life, which are more tractable and easier to study. In the case of regulatory
pathways involved in the cell cycle, a successful investigative strategy in-
volves the comparative use of data collected from two types of fungi: fission
yeast (Schizosaccharomyces pombe) and baker’s yeast (Saccharomyces ce-
revisiae). I will now focus on the management of Dt in relation to the collec-
tion and dissemination of data from these two organisms, particularly the
role played by databases in making them available for comparative analysis.
S. cerevisiae has long been a favorite model in biology, with a vast rep-
ertoire of knowledge, databases, and tools available to researchers interested
in studying the cell cycle. It thus constitutes an obvious starting point to
identify new regulatory functions associated with cell replication. However,
cerevisiae spends a lot of time in the G1 phase of the cell cycle, which is
problematic for researchers interested in investigating the S and G2 phases
of the cycle (see fig. 2). S. pombe, a much simpler form of life with three
chromosomes to cerevisiae’s 16, turns out to work as an ideal complement:
its S and G2 phases are longer, enabling researchers to scrutinize their poten-
tial regulatory functions, and the shared evolutionary history of the two or-6. This line of research was made famous by the work of Paul Nurse, Tim Hunt, and
Leland H. Hartwell, earning them a Nobel prize in 2001.
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All uganisms makes it plausible to expect that regulatory mechanisms found in
pombe may be conserved in cerevisiae. The systematic comparison of data
produced in cerevisiae and pombe produced findings that turned out to be
conserved in humans, making this approach useful to understanding the
emergence of cancer (e.g., Caetano et al. 2014).
What makes this investigative strategy possible is the opportunity to re-
trieve, visualize, and compare yeast data through PomBase and Schizosac-
charomyces Genome Database (SGD), the main databases for pombe and
cerevisiae. Robert de Bruin, a leading scientists involved in this work, de-
scribes the strategy as follows:se subwe used PomBase to find whether that [mechanism] was conserved in fis-
sion yeast. We could really easily establish it in fission yeast, and then we
could go back to budding yeast now that we knew exactly what we’re look-
ing at, and then found that also in budding yeast. . . . Now my work in my
lab is all focused on that. Without going into fission yeast and having it ac-
cessible that easily, I would have never gone in, and I would have com-
pletely missed it. And people in budding yeast completely missed even thatFigure 2. Different phases of the cell cycle in S. cerevisiae. Source: Michel Durinx
(CC BY 4.0), https://datastudies.eu/resources#cc-by. Color version available as an
online enhancement.This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
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All regulation, let alone themechanism, and the same inmammalian cells. Peo-
ple have been studying that for decades and completely missed it. (Tran-
script PI_8_A in Leonelli [2017])Without the quick and accurate comparative tools provided by PomBase and
SGD, it would have beenmuch harder for researchers to compare data across
the two species, potentially hindering the discovery of significant connec-
tions between their regulatory systems. As it turns out, making it “really easy”
to explore data in this way requires labor-intensive practices of data annota-
tion and curation, which largely determine which data sets are found online,
what information about the data is captured and made available within data-
bases, and how the data are presented and retrieved for inferential reason-
ing. Database curators pay particular attention to the selection and inclusion
of information about the provenance of data, such as the time at which data
were produced and further processed. This often means consulting directly
with the original data producers, who are not always accurate when publish-
ing their data as part of research articles and may quickly lose memory of or
interest in these details after the end of their project. This information en-
hances researchers’ ability to assess the quality of the data and the extent to
which each source is comparable to others.
Database curators also participate in the development and application of
standard labels identifying the phenomena for which data may serve as ev-
idence, a task made difficult by the diversity of terms used by different bio-
logical communities to denote the same genes, gene functions, and phenotypes
(most often in the case of groups working on different species; Leonelli and
Ankeny 2012). The developers of both PomBase and SGD are deeply en-
gaged in the construction of classification systems, such as the Gene Ontol-
ogy and the Fission Yeast Phenotype Ontology, that make it possible for re-
searchers to look for data of potential relevance to the phenomena they are
interested in. This work requires regular updates of data formats and labels to
reflect shifts in the knowledge base and in the technologies used to produce
and disseminate data. Much effort is devoted to providing an accurate record
of Dt, that is, a timeline for the ways in which data are manipulated to remain
accessible and usable. Such a record is indispensable to the comparison of
data acquired on different species, especially when—as in our example—re-
searchers are not sure about the relation between the phenomena under in-
vestigation in the two types of organisms. In such cases, precise notations
about the temporality and provenance of data are crucial to interpretation:
researchers need to know when and why a certain data set has come to be
associated with a given phenomenon and how such inference may be trian-
gulated with findings coming from complementary approaches (such as the
functional and evolutionary data required to establish a mechanism as con-
served; Bechtel 2006).This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
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All uRemarkably, the better database curators accomplish these tasks, the more
their work remains invisible to database users and research funders. The ep-
istemic significance of these practices becomes visible whenever a lack of
information about Dt affects the ability of database users to interpret the data.
Because of the strong collaborative ethos and relatively small size character-
izing the community of pombe researchers, PomBase curators are highly suc-
cessful in eliciting accurate and updated information from data producers.
This does not work as well in larger research communities, where database
curators are confronted with much larger data sets, and data producers have
little incentive to participate in data curation. It also fails within the increas-
ingly nested landscape of data infrastructures characterizing contemporary
biomedical research, where information about Dt is easily lost when data are
passed from one platform to another—leading to a situation of high uncer-
tainty around Dt, similar to what we encountered in the first example. In-
deed, the yeast researchers I interviewed reacted strongly against the sugges-
tion that it may be efficient to integrate all data relating to yeast species in one
single database, which in their view may entail significant loss of informa-
tion about data provenance.
4. The Epistemic Significance of Data Time. In the cases described above,
Dt may span several different events over an extended period, ranging from
the moment in which data are originally collected to the times at which they
are modified to make themwidely accessible and reusable. Ideally, given the
significance of knowledge about Dt for data analysis and interpretation, the
researchers and curators involved in data processing (including the compi-
lation and visualization of data in publications, databases, maps, and mod-
els) should ensure that information about Dt accompanies the relevant data
points in all stages of their travels. This is what happened in my second ex-
ample, in which attentive data curation and a well-constructed database en-
able researchers to easily find information about Dt and use it for data anal-
ysis. However, particularly in situations in which Dt is recorded under
diverse working conditions by individuals with different skills and goals,
Dt can be remarkably difficult to track and retrieve. Our first example illus-
trates the problems that can emerge when researchers have limited access to
the history of the data that they are analyzing.
Knowledge or ignorance of Dt can thus affect research processes and out-
comes in (at least) two ways. First, it can alter researchers’ perception of
which data sets are most reliable as sources of evidence, thus affecting the
evidential value attributed to data in any given inquiry. Without access to
accurate information about Dt, researchers may need to reject whole data
sets or modify the ways in which they analyze them (e.g., by shifting their
evidential weight in relation to other sources or seeking to triangulate themThis content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
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THE TIME OF DATA 751with other types of findings). This is clear in the case of pathogen spread,
where researchers found it problematic to deal with data sets for which they
could not distinguish between Dt1 and other Dts, thus throwing doubt on the
reliability of existing data maps and related modeling tools. Although less
overtly, this also happens in the case of cross-species study of transcriptional
regulation, where researchers needing to reuse data available online need to
be able to trace when the data were collected, with which technology, and by
whom. These examples show that preserving data is not enough to facilitate
their future reuse. Equally relevant is the preservation of information about
the temporality of the interventions through which data have been assem-
bled, circulated, and visualized.
Second, knowledge or ignorance of Dt can determine the frame and res-
olution at which phenomena are studied, thus affecting researchers’ under-
standing of phenomena—including their perception of what can be known
and what aspects of a given target system are worth focusing on. Consider,
for instance, the epistemic risk posed by the integration of data acquired on
various aspects of a phenomenon of interest by a variety of sources, such as
when bringing together genomic, metabolic, environmental, and physiolog-
ical data collected by different research teams in order to study gene-
environment interactions (see also O’Malley and Soyer 2012; Leonelli 2016,
chap. 6). Such integration is crucial to providing novel insights into complex
processes (particularly in the emerging landscape of “big data” analysis), yet
both examples show that it carries the risk of loss of information about Dt,
since not all existing information about data is preserved when bringing large
and diverse data sets together. This carries significant implications for data
analysis and the reliability of subsequent inferential processes. Wrong infor-
mation about Dt or difficulties in aligning different Dt can result in predictive
failure of models or misleading cross-species inference.
5. Conclusion: Timescales of Data Processing and the Limits of Exper-
imental Control. I proposed to focus on the temporal dimensions involved
in practices of data processing and distinguish between Dt and Pt to shed
light on the extent to which the diverse timescales of data and phenomena
affect processes of inference and knowledge production. Through the anal-
ysis of two examples from biological practice, I have emphasized the com-
plex set of conditions required to preserve data and related metadata in the
long term and argued that data processing and related temporalities are cru-
cial to inferential processes and (re)interpretation. I thus hope to have illus-
trated how tracing the movements of data through processes of inquiry, par-
ticularly the conditions under which data do or do not function as evidence,
can help to foster philosophical understanding of how data processing af-
fects the content of knowledge claims.Data are defined by their temporal char-This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
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All uacteristics as much as by their spatial and morphological ones, and underes-
timating the challenges and timescales involved in data processing can dis-
rupt inferential reasoning and invalidate the use of data as evidence.
In closing, I briefly examine one implication of this argument, which is
that experimental control over data production is not enough to guarantee
good, (re)usable data. This is significant when considering philosophical ac-
counts that portray historical and experimental sciences as exemplifying two
opposed epistemic situations: one in which researchers have complete con-
trol over the range, type, and quantity of data that they can obtain on the phe-
nomena of interest, thus providing strong warrant for inferential claimsmade
on the basis of those data, and one in which researchers cannot control what
data are available and are thus “at the mercy of the processes by which time
covers her tracks” (Currie 2018, 7), which seems to threaten the epistemic
reliability of their claims.7
Both Currie and Alison Wylie have critiqued facile dismissals of the ep-
istemic reliability and scope of claims made within the historical sciences,
by pointing to the variety of evidence and methods that researchers in those
fields can use (e.g., modeling, analogies, various new technologies to study
the composition of material traces) as well as the importance of triangula-
tion and consilience in warranting inferences in other fields (Chapman and
Wylie 2016; Wylie 2017; Currie 2018). My analysis in this article corrob-
orates their arguments through the following observation: not only is the pes-
simism about the epistemic status of the historical sciences based on a lack
of recognition of their methodological sophistication in processing data, but
it is also linked to an exaggerated optimism with respect to the potential and
warrants of experimental methods in contemporary science and the extent to
which they can really guarantee control over phenomena.
The cases of data handling that I analyzed above, particularly my second
example, point to the fact that experimental results are difficult to control,
not only at the point at which they are produced but most significantly at
the point of dissemination, storage, and reuse. Data can disappear or become
unusable very quickly if not properly curated: it only takes a destroyed hard
disk, a misleading annotation, or a postdoc changing jobs.Worries about dif-
ferential survival of evidence and informational destruction are thus argu-
ably as alive with contemporary data collection in the life sciences as they
are for historical sciences and observational data therein. And because ex-
perimentalists today operate in what are often characterized as ideal condi-7. A similar distinction is frequently made between hermeneutic and quantitative ap-
proaches to data reuse (as championed by the social and natural sciences, respectively)
and is convincingly challenged by James McAllister in his contribution to the PSA sym-
posium where this article was also presented (McAllister 2018).
This content downloaded from 144.173.177.067 on February 14, 2019 03:28:49 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
THE TIME OF DATA 753tions (particularly in the case of molecular biology, where they can avail
themselves of ready-made samples, high-throughput instruments for data
production, high computational power, andmyriads of modeling tools), they
themselves tend to underestimate the challenges involved in processing data
and related information, which can cause real trouble with data interpretation
and inferential reasoning down the line. Both scientists and philosophers can
learn from the strategies elaboratedwithin the historical sciences to record and
update information about Dt and thus maximize the evidential value of exist-
ing data collections.REFERENCES
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